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European Union citizens have come to believe that 
they stand for civilised conflict resolution. This 
belief seems at times to be something like the Holy 
Ghost, always present and pervasive in our souls, 
surely goodness itself, but difficult to put your 
hands on. The doctrine flows freely in official 
texts of the European Union, from the European 
Security Strategy documents produced by High 
Representative Javier Solana through to the 
European Neighbourhood Policy documents 
coming from the European Commission. But the 
logic and mechanics of conflict resolution are 
rarely explicit when it comes to confronting the 
so-called ‘frozen’, ethno-secessionist conflicts of 
the south east European periphery.  
Of course this belief is founded in real historical 
experiences that have become part of the public 
awareness. The biggest case of all has been the 
reconciliation of Germany with its neighbours, 
structured into what has become the European 
Union. But several model cases of resolution of 
local ethno-political conflicts have also become 
part of the political culture of various 
communities, ranging from the Aland Islands 
solution agreed between Swedes and Finns in 
1921, the devolution of Belgium into a bi-
communal federal state over the last several 
decades, the solution found after the second 
world war to the South Tyrol problem on the 
Italian-Austrian frontier, and the semi-resolution 
of the Northern Ireland conflict in the last few 
years. All these cases settle down in the fuzzy 
ideology of contemporary Europe, which has 
something to do with post-modern, multi-tier and 
multi-national integration and governance based 
on common political values and the rule of law. 
A cautious note has however also to be introduced 
immediately, given that the recent conflicts of 
Europe’s south eastern periphery have not readily 
dissolved themselves with the mediating efforts of 
the norm-setting organisations – the UN, OSCE and 
Council of Europe, as well as the EU. The currency 
of the term ‘frozen conflict’ testifies to this. As a 
result, the diplomatic circuit has often been producing 
little more than repetitive streams of pious declarations 
on these frozen conflicts, year after year.  
A group of us therefore decided recently to look 
systematically into four unresolved ethno-secessionist 
conflicts in Europe’s south eastern periphery, to see 
whether the European Union was pursuing any identifiable 
logic in its search for solutions.
1 These cases were chosen 
so as to be at different distances politically and 
geographically from core Europe. The four cases, to which 
I add here a fifth, were: 
-  Cyprus, where our recent study was shadowing the 
negotiation of the Annan Plan, and which resulted in the 
Yes-No referendum result in April 2004, and thence the 
accession of Greek Cyprus alone in May;  
-  Serbia and Montenegro, which in 2003 formed a thin 
but maybe unsustainable union as a result of heavy 
mediating pressures from the EU, with the incentive of 
full membership in the long run; 
-  Moldova and Transniestria, which has become a 
chronic case of unproductive mediation sponsored by 
the OSCE, while Moldova’s interest in European 
integration has increased in recent years, and with 
Moldova becoming a first partner for of the EU’s new 
European Neighbourhood Policy;  
-  Georgia and Abkhazia, where the de facto secession of 
Abkhazia is deeply entrenched and protected by Russia, 
while the new regime in Tbilisi now openly adopts a 
Europeanisation discourse; and 
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-  Turkey and its Kurds, for whom the normalisation of 
post-conflict relations now takes place in the context of 
the EU’s political conditions for the possible opening 
and conduct of negotiations for accession as full 
member state.  
The analytical tool kit  
It would be good to have a robust body of theory to 
structure work under the heading of Europeanisation and 
conflict resolution, but unfortunately that is asking too 
much for the time being. However we can try to assemble 
more modestly an analytical tool kit, at least to provide a 
standard conceptual framework and some language. We 
now set in their skeletal outlines four parts to the tool kit, 
which need to be integrated in practice. 
Conflict models. Most of the ethno-secessionist conflicts of 
Europe’s south eastern periphery can be placed within the 
framework of a stylised process. Initially there were a 
number of empires (Ottoman, British, Soviet, Yugoslav) 
keeping the order in ethnically complex states. Sometimes 
the empire actually created conditions for future conflict 
with divide and rule methods, or by transferring 
populations, or drawing political frontiers that were bound 
to cause trouble later. Upon the collapse of the empires, the 
frustrated grievances of ethnic communities exploded in 
conflict, especially because of the non-existent democratic 
culture that the newly independent states inherited. The 
conflict parties prove unable to negotiate a political 
settlement. Initially this is because of the bitterness of the 
conflict, or because one party has achieved its objective 
through gains of territory or de facto secession, and the 
other party lacks the means to reverse this. The recent post-
communist context has also meant privatisation of property, 
providing ample opportunities for the new leaderships to 
build up new economic interests, consolidating the status 
quo. Given the impasse between the conflict parties, 
external parties enter the process, either as neutral 
mediators, or as powerful external actors. At some point the 
external actors may offer significant incentives and heavily 
mediate a settlement. Further, they may in some cases 
impose a solution, unless of course there is more than one 
of them who cannot agree between themselves, in which 
case the mediation remains ineffective. Assuming a 
political settlement has been heavily mediated or imposed, 
the process has then to turn to the task of transformation of 
the perceived interests of the former conflict parties, 
without which the settlement may prove unsustainable. At 
this point Europeanisation may be the key, at least in the 
wider European neighbourhood. 
Europeanisation process. The term Europeanisation has 
gained currency in political science literature over the past 
decade or so, as scholars tried to understand the politico-
economic-societal transformation involved in European 
integration, and especially in the cases of states acceding to 
the European Union after exiting from fascist or communist 
regimes. Europeanisation may be seen as working through 
three kinds of mechanism, which interact synergetically: 
•  legal obligations in political and economic domains 
flowing from Council of Europe membership and the 
requirements for accession to the EU 
•  objective changes in economic structures and the 
interests of individuals as a result of integration with 
Europe 
•  subjective changes in the beliefs, expectations and 
identity of the individual, feeding political will to adopt 
European norms of business, politics and civil society.  
Here we define Europeanisation for the particular context 
of conflict settlement and resolution as:  
a mechanism and a process at the same time which 
is activated and encouraged by European 
institutions by linking the final outcome of the 
conflict with the degree of integration or 
association of conflict parties with European 
structures. This link is made operational by means 
of specific conditionality and socialisation 
mechanisms, which are built into the process of 
Europeanisation.
2 
European multi-tier governance. The particularity of 
European multi-tier governance is that it has introduced the 
practice of three-tier federalism, with the EU tier as the 
third tier to add to the federal state and the federated 
entities. This three-tier federalism is most relevant for 
present purposes in the several cases of ethno-federations 
such as Belgium, Spain and the United Kingdom, as 
opposed to the ethnically homogenous federations such as 
Austria and Germany. The range of interesting three-tier 
solutions extends also to such cases as the Aland Islands.  
There are several features of these cases that warrant 
recognition as model mechanisms, all good for the tool kit. 
The Belgian case is notable for the very high degree of 
devolution of powers to the two communities, and as a 
result the need to have developed a coordination 
mechanism between them and the federal government. This 
leads into the model type of the thin common state, which 
may serve as a single state in international law, but which 
in an extreme case becomes a coordination mechanism for 
the federal government to be mandated for negotiations in 
EU and international fora. The common state becomes a 
compromise between federation and confederation. The 
cases of Spain and the UK are examples of the asymmetric 
federation, in which entities such as Catalonia and Scotland 
retain much more autonomy than other regions, and view 
their direct relations with the EU as satisfying part of their 
demands for partial independence. The case of Northern 
Ireland sees the third EU tier of governance as transforming 
the traditional ideas of irredentist secession with a vision of 
both the UK to Ireland sharing sovereignty in the EU’s 
post-modern structures. The Aland Islands case is also a 
classic solution for autonomy of a minority community, 
which in an alternative political setting, such as in 
contemporary south east Europe, might have seen a war of 
irredentist secession (e.g. Nagorno Karabakh). The overall 
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conclusion is that the European Union has a rich experience 
of creative multi-tier governance solutions for actual or 
potential ethno-secessionist conflicts. 
European mediation and conditionality models. Our study 
of the case examples has led us to identify three model 
types for how the EU uses its doctrine, incentives and 
conditionality in relation to unresolved conflicts in its 
periphery, for each of which there is both a logic of 
intended outcomes and a hazard of unintended effects. 
These are set out in Table 1. 
Table 1. EU conditionality and socialisation models
3 
  Model I – 
Common 
state solution 
Model II – 
Sequential route to 
the common state 
Model III – 
Two state 
solution 
EU policy  EU favours 
one common 
state. 
EU favours one of 
the conflict parties, 
viewing the other as 
the ‘unreasonable’ 
party. 
EU reluctantly 
accepts 
secession, and 
treats both 
entities equally. 
Intended 
effects 
Settlement 
reached, 
secession 
avoided, 
transformation 
to follow. 
The ‘other’ party is 
isolated, weakened 
and returns to the 
negotiating table. 
Settlement and 
transformation 
follow.  
Conflict 
resolved with 
velvet divorce, 
transformation 
follows. 
Unintended 
effects 
Creation of 
dysfunctional 
state. 
Empowerment 
of ‘wrong’ 
political 
parties. 
Excluded party 
becomes more 
entrenched as failing 
state, and/or is 
annexed by another 
external power.  
Or, the favoured 
party becomes 
‘unreasonable’. 
Domino effect, 
destabilising 
other regions, 
favouring the 
proliferation of 
micro-states. 
 
The standard doctrine is to try to discourage ethno-political 
secession in general, and especially where it cannot be 
agreed peacefully between the parties in accordance with 
constitutional procedures. Model I therefore sees the EU 
mediating in favour of a common state solution, which may 
be successful, but with risks of forcing the birth of a 
dysfunctional state. Where over a long period the parties 
fail to agree, the EU may come to regard one party as being 
unreasonable, and therefore switch from a position of 
neutrality to one of favouring the other party. Under this 
Model II, the unreasonable party is isolated and weakened, 
and in due course becomes more realistic, returning to 
negotiate a fair common state solution. Here the possible 
unintended effects are several: relapse of the penalised 
party into a failed state condition, or its virtual annexation 
by another external power, or even for the favoured party to 
turn unreasonable when the excluded party itself becomes 
reasonable. Finally, in the case of Model III, the EU 
reluctantly concludes that it must recognise secession and 
treat both parties equally, and here the risks of unintended 
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effects lie with the possible destabilisation of other regions 
or the proliferation of micro-states.  
Applications 
When the EU candidacy of Cyprus was launched, the EU’s 
discourse set off down the track of Model I, arguing for 
conflict settlement and re-unification before accession. The 
incentive of accession was supposed to support the UN’s 
role as mediator. When the last round of negotiations 
leading up to the Annan plan got seriously into the 
substance of a possible agreement, the UN mediator indeed 
took on board the future context of EU membership. It 
detailed a three-tier constitution, drawing explicit 
inspiration from the Belgian model. But meanwhile at their 
Helsinki summit in December 1999 the EU switched from 
Model I to Model II, given that Greece threatened to hold 
the whole enlargement hostage to the accession of Cyprus, 
re-unified or divided. Turkish Cyprus was indeed 
threatened with a disastrous outlook, also because President 
Denktas cast himself so readily in the role of the 
‘unreasonable’ party. The story then initially took the 
expected course of the isolated party appreciating its weak 
position, and the elections in December 2003 shifted the 
political balance in northern Cyprus towards the Annan 
plan. This was then reinforced by Ankara’s decision, in the 
interests of its own EU accession strategy, to tip the balance 
decisively in favour of the Annan plan, proposing the 
formula of letting Annan ‘fill in the blanks’ where there 
might remain differences between the principal parties.  
However the story then took its extra twist, when the new 
Greek Cypriot government, with its accession to the EU 
secured, hardened its own position on the Annan plan. The 
favoured party had become the ‘unreasonable’ one. The EU 
was so disappointed at this, after the resulting No-Yes vote 
in the referendum in April, that it resolved immediately to 
end the isolation of Turkish Cyprus. The Commission 
proposed a de-blockading of trade with Northern Cyprus, 
aid programmes and an office in the north, etc. Turkish 
Cyprus seemed thus to be heading into a new institutional 
category, that of a sub-state entity that is virtually EU 
territory, most of whose population are EU citizens with 
Republic of Cyprus passports. In so doing, the EU would 
have been managing its second shift in strategy from Model 
II to something approaching Model III. However, the 
Republic of Cyprus, as new member state, has so far 
blocked acceptance of this package of measures in the 
Council, which if sustained would mean that the EU had 
moved back to a hard-line Model II. 
In the case of Serbia and Montenegro, the EU again 
strongly favoured a Model I common state solution, and 
Javier Solana was such a forceful mediator that the new 
Union is known in the region as ‘Solania’. Settlement was 
achieved but the transformation is not happening, and a 
secession option after three years had to be included in the 
pact at the insistence of Montenegro. Unfortunately the full 
set of unintended effects is on display: the dysfunctional 
state and empowerment of the ‘wrong’ political parties. The 
thin common state resembles the coordination model, 
which should be capable of functioning. The problem is 
that the EU tier of governance is not yet there to hold it 4 | Michael Emerson 
 
together. The discord over the level of tariff protection 
illustrates why. Montenegro favours lower external 
protection than Serbia. With EU accession the issue would 
be simply eliminated as the common external tariff 
prevails. But with accession not yet on the horizon, the 
divergence of interests has been real.  
Regarding the party politics of the Union, its strongest 
supporters turn out to be the Serb nationalists (e.g. former 
Milosevic party people), whose ideology is furthest away 
from European thinking. Finally the Serbia and 
Montenegro case study has also revealed a difference in the 
inclinations of the EU institutions between the Javier 
Solana and the foreign ministers’ Council versus the 
Commission. Foreign ministers strive to mediate a 
settlement. The Commission has to manage the 
transformation and sustainability of the settlement. While 
Javier Solana and Chris Patten are respected for their 
sincere efforts to cooperate, their institutions have naturally 
different perspectives, and the Union of Serbia and 
Montenegro seems to be viewed more sceptically by the 
Commission. Serbia and Montenegro may separate after the 
initial three-year period, but still the EU foreign ministers 
are very cautious about a switch to Model III, as the fears 
of destabilising again Bosnia, Macedonia and Kosovo 
remain vivid. Both Serbia and Montenegro are however 
very attentive to avoiding being branded the unreasonable 
party (as in Model II), since they fear being penalised by 
the EU relative to the other party.  
In the case of Moldova and Transniestria also the EU has 
for years sustained the discourse favouring a common state 
solution (classic Model I), but offering very little by way of 
incentives. But in the last year the game has moved 
somewhat. On the one hand the EU has cautiously raised 
the level of its incentive for the Europeanisation of 
Moldova, by including it as a first candidate for the new 
European Neighbourhood Policy. On the other hand it is 
now branding the Transniestria as the unreasonable party, 
backing this up with a visa ban on its leadership, all of 
whom happen to be Russian citizens. So the EU is 
switching into Model II, but not strongly enough for the 
government of Moldova, which wants its ‘European option’ 
to be recognised with a ‘perspective of EU membership’. It 
is doubtful that Model II will work as the EU hopes it will. 
Transniestria’s reliance on Russia is intensified, while 
Russia itself refuses Moldova’s requests that the EU join 
the OSCE mediating group. The EU’s refusal to grant a 
membership perspective to Moldova may have further 
unintended but predictable consequences in a few years 
after Romanian accession to the EU. Most Moldovans can 
easily obtain Romanian citizenship and therefore future EU 
citizenship, which means that without a membership 
perspective the already disastrous emigration trend will 
intensify. Then there could also be a return in due course to 
the idea of re-unification with Romania as the only track 
into the EU, following the German DDR re-unification 
model. This is absolutely not desired by the EU. However 
the agreement signed by President Snegur of Moldova and 
President Yeltsin of Russia in July 1992 recognised the 
right of the population of Transniestria to determine their 
future in case Moldova were to unite with Romania, i.e. 
possibly legitimise the secession of Transniestria and 
maybe its absorption by Russia. The conclusion would 
seem to be if the EU pursues a half-hearted Model II 
strategy, it could end up with perverse and negative results.  
Also in the case of Georgia and Abkhazia, the EU has been 
sustaining a Model I common state discourse, but bringing 
limited incentives into play, and having no role as such in 
the UN-sponsored mediation efforts. France, Germany and 
the UK do have a role, while France has a role in the OSCE 
Minsk Group for the Nagorno Karabakh case. But the EU 
has not yet seen fit to Europeanise these mediation efforts, 
which undermines the credibility of the EU as a conflict 
resolution partner. The new Saakashvili regime in Tbilisi 
opens up fresh possibilities. Saakashvili has had a success 
in forcing the Ajaran quasi-separatist leader Abashidse to 
retire to Russia without bloodshed. Also the new Georgian 
leadership openly declares its ambitions to obtain an EU 
membership perspective. The EU has offered its new 
Neighbourhood Policy, but without any mention of a 
membership perspective, even for the very long-run. In 
recent years both Abkhazia and Southern Ossetia have been 
integrating increasingly with Russia, with their populations 
obtaining Russian citizenship. Whether a stronger EU 
incentive would make a real difference is doubtful, unless 
Russia became convinced that a re-unification of Georgia 
with some federative arrangement was in its interests. If the 
EU proceeds at the end of 2004 to open accession 
negotiations with Turkey, then there would be new 
possibilities to act together more effectively in the 
Caucasus, and possibly to bring Russia to take interest in a 
cooperative deal of this type, for example by opening up 
and developing the entire east Black Sea coastline.  
Finally, a word on Turkey and its Kurds. The conflict 
between Turkey and the PKK Marxist separatist Kurds 
raged for 15 years, but by 1999 Turkey had virtually won 
the war, employing harsh and much criticised military 
tactics. Since then the Kurdish leadership has abandoned 
the objective of secession, and pursues the objective of 
conventional minority rights. Political settlement was 
achieved by Turkey’s victory in war, and now the societal 
transformation has to take place to make peace sustainable. 
This is what seems to be happening now, following the 
acceptance by the EU of Turkey’s candidacy in Helsinki in 
December 1999, just after the end of the war. Since then, 
and especially after the AK party became the government 
in 2002, the EU’s conditionality machine has been working 
on full power. The EU is playing a major part now in the 
transformation of Turkey’s political norms and institutions, 
all the way down to the issue of minority rights for the 
Kurds. Here the second phase of the EU’s Model I seems to 
be working, but after the war had been fought and won 
without the EU in the first phase.  
The overall conclusion from this short survey of five cases 
is that the EU has a long way to go before becoming a 
master in the art of conflict resolution. Its heart may be in 
the right place. But its ‘actorness’ is still weak, except 
when there are foreseeable prospects of accession 
negotiations. The hazards of perverse and unintended 
consequences are frequently visible where the EU pushes 
for civilised solutions, but with only half-hearted 
deployment of incentives and instruments of action.  